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:M E ll 0 R A ltT D U U. 
_______ .... 
On Monday, Augsut lst, Mr. Davison called on me 
in New York, but he was not feeling well, and little 
was accomplished toward the discussion of Far Eastern 
a:f:fairs. He gave a general impression that the foreign 
adventureo of the group were almost more trouble than 
. they were worth; that the group wao greatly impresoed 
with its patriotism and the burden of expense and 
trouble it was encountering in prosecuting this pol1t1ca.l-
fina.ncial affair; it wished to consult the desires of 
the Governmen.t but wanted to knov1 where it stood. Ile 
remarked that the China business had cost them $70 1000 
in a year, that Kuhn , Loeb and Company, the National 
City ~ank, and the First National Bank knew nothing 
about the business exoept when impressed with it by 
being confronted with the expense account, that they 
depended entirely upon the ~organs for their informa.-
t ion, and attributed entirely to the Morgans their 
finding themselves in this business. 
At. Mr . Davison's requeo~ I agreed to be present 
the next day at eleven at a ~eting o~ the group . 
At. 
2 
At this D'eting there were prooent J. P. Morgan, Sr., 
lr. Vanderlip, President of the City National Bank, Mr. 
, Preeident or the First National :Bankt Mr. 
a.-
Otto K~, of Kuhn, Loeb and Company, and Mr. McKnight, 
of J. P,.J!organ and Compaey . I said I was fresh from 
full discussion with the Secretary a.nd would be very 
glad to explain to them the Department's views i:f" they 
ould let ~ know as to what they desired to be in-
formed. Mr . 1.torgan then made some rather vague renmrks 
in the swre general tone as ?:.tr . Davison's of' the da.Y 
before. As to the Hukuang loan he said he supposed 
everything was all right . I said it appeared so , and 
that the transaction seemed to have been a brilliant 
success. As to the Ch1n-a1 railway he spoke discourag-
ingly and enumerated many powers including Germany as 
opposed. I pointed out that Japan had agreed to partici-
pate upon condition of the construction of a branch line 
and that as a. result 1t would seam that Japan ,ooµld not 
now make more than perfunotori opposition eve~it aooepted 
ti/' 
the- Russian interpretation of the C_onvent ion of July 4 
(Article 1) to the effect that Japan must join Russia in 
opposition to this road, as one detrimental to legitimate 
Russian railway interests. ~s for Russia we had had a 
long 
long and amioable correspondence, bJ1t the . present 
Minister for Foreign Atfairs seemed absolutely oppoued 
to the Chin-a1 road; although Russia admitted it oonld 
not prevent its construction it gave notice of an in• 
tontion to be disagreeable to China if the roadf were 
built. 
I recalled the ~act that when Mr. Davison ~iret 
consulted the Secretary about the Chin~ai project, the 
Secretary had sa1d that it being an Anglo-American 
project this Government would be disposed to support 
it if the British Government did. I emphasized the ~act 
that indoed from the very first the Departraent had em-
phasized the groat desirability or having a po.erful 
.American bank in China to avail o~ all aorta of op~or­
tuni ties in the Far Ea.st since China was now only on 
the threshhold of development, and I recapitulated the 
matter or the Chin-a.1 railway, pointing cut that wren 
this Government consulted Great llrita.in about the n-eu-
tralization plan Great Dri ta.in vary cord1al.ly approved \ 
in principle, and had almost unequivocally underta~:an 
to supnort the Chin-ai railway. Since then (an I ex• 
plained with some frankness) the British Foreign Otfice 
'" had persistently claimed to be .bound by an obsolet~· 






An for :British support it might come with a ol,a.nge 
ot ministry or with a change ot heart Qn the part 
o'f the preeent Government, which might result trom 
the inoraasing op-poaition Of J3riti8h public Opinion 
to the preAent ~r1t1sh policy in China. Of course 
the rrojeet could be abandoned by this country and the 
burden or the loss ot prestige cast upon Great Er1tain1 
bt~t abandot"..zoont of the pr oje ot might perhaps be a severe 
blow to the preetige of the United States . Another 
possibility would be eubetant1al German participation 
with strong German diplomatic support, whether without 
~ritish support or ultimately with British support, --
t. t .t..e, I i' ""'°" ~ 7:: ~f: ~ the latter ~~ a.alla~le being one of great political 
/I 
importance . 
Yr. Kt\'f}n renarked that he thought the Ger?:l&!ls would 
be glad to join. 
These things_,! eaid,,must be very ca.refu1ly and 
deliberately considered by the Government . 
---~Perhaps Mr. Menooal, the group's representative, 
anxious to accomplish something quiokly,was sending too 
eenoational reports fro~ Peking . At all events, the 
Government had authorized the Legation to keep the Chinese 
Government from losing courage and would continue to use 
its 
5 
its influence so ta.r as China was conce:rned. It 
should be the role o'! t~ group to do their part in 
a quiet way to the same end. In speaking particularly 
to Ur. Horgan I tried to make it clear that to do any 
real good the American bankers should go to China to 
stay instead ot nnking spasmodic on1 superficial et~ 
torts. They all seem to have the teeling that American 
business is so much easier that it ltardly paid them 
/ to do this. As to establishing a bank (in China.), just 
ae to opening a Pan-American bank, u:r. Vanderlip com-
plained that they could not even get a charter without 
an amendment to the Foderal banking law. 
It was suggested that there be another mooting 
later in the day, but Mr. Kahn said that I had ma.de 
the Department's views very clear, that they would 
better themselves con~er and reach some decision. 
In summing up the situation, tho Goverrunent will 
endeavor to encourage China in k~eping opportunities 
open. The group should quietly do the same by showing 
no signs of retreating. All concerned should wait 
patiently and na1ntain the status quo pending devel-
opment of the ultimate :British attitude, arid pend!ng 
oonsideration by the United States ot ma.king overtures 
dipl.omtioally or through the 'ba.nkers for German o:o• 
operation on a large soale . 
" 
•. 
